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We consider a general family of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols utilizing displaced
thermal states with discretized modulations. Separating the effects of the Gaussian channel and
the non-Gaussian distribution, we have studied the dependence of the secret key generation rate on
the magnitude of modulations (the strength of the modulated signal). We show that in the limit of
strong signal, QKD is impossible: from the perspective of an efficient eavesdropper, the ensemble
of transmitted states is effectively classical. This constitutes a quantum correction to performance
of finite-length QKD protocols. We demonstrate that two regimes must be distinguished: weak and
strong thermal noise. In the case of strong noise, the security boundary is mostly determined by
the weak-signal limit. When the noise is weak, however, QKD may become possible only when the
signal strength exceeds some critical value.
I. INTRODUCTION
The inherent asymmetry of three-way quantum com-
munications is one of the drastic differences between clas-
sical and quantum communications. A quantum state
sent by one party cannot be freely shared between re-
maining two. This circumstance is formalized by the fa-
mous no-cloning theorem: an unknown quantum state
cannot be cloned [1, 2]. Indeed, if such cloner existed,
it would have to commute with all operators acting on
the cloned state and, hence, its action would be inde-
pendent of the cloned state. This demonstrates that the
no-cloning property has similar fundamental roots as the
Heisenberg uncertainty relation. Consequently, gaining
information about an unknown state with necessity per-
turbs the state, as in the noise-disturbance uncertainty
relation [3]. Thus, roughly, sharing an unknown quan-
tum state between two parties is a ”zero-sum game”: one
party can gain information about the state only at the
expense of another party.
This principal feature of quantum communications
constitutes a foundation for the quantum key distribution
(QKD) [4–8] aiming at producing by two parties proba-
bilistically non-interceptable shared keys over authenti-
cated channels. As hinted by the proof of the no-cloning
theorem above, in order to avoid direct cloning, states
that can be associated with non-commuting operators
must be employed. Therefore, essentially, QKD proto-
cols are based on sending non-orthogonal non-coinciding
states and subsequent recovering of a shared key from
apparently a random preparation and observation data.
Since, at this stage, the data held by communicating
parties is classical, it falls under classical Shannon’s in-
formation framework and, hence, the shared key can be
recovered using an adaptation of an error-correcting al-
gorithm.
Initially, QKD was developed for discrete variables,
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such as electron spin or photon polarization, but later
the class of physical systems enabling QKD was extended
by incorporating continuous variables (CV-QKD), for in-
stance, quadratures of the electromagnetic field. More-
over, it was shown in Ref.[9] that displaced thermal states
can be used for generating the secret key thus dissociat-
ing QKD from the sole nature of utilized states. Since
displaced states can be regarded as a result of quasi-
classical driving of a cavity in thermal equilibrium, this
significantly relaxes requirements with respect to state
sources.
Bringing QKD to the realm of conventional sources
boosted the development of practical QKD infrastruc-
tures, which potentially may significantly impact the field
of secure communications. The main success in realiz-
ing CV-QKD is achieved in the optical and near-infrared
spectral domains owing to the ready availability of highly
coherent sources of the electromagnetic field and the low
magnitude of thermal noise at room temperature [8].
The propagation of the QKD technologies further
down the electromagnetic spectrum meets several obsta-
cles. The main challenge appears to stem from thermal
noise. With decreasing the base frequency, ω, the noise
magnitude grows fast, ∼ exp(ωT /ω) with ωT = kBT/~,
once ω < ωT . Here, ~ is the Planck constant, kB is the
Boltzmann constant, and T is the channel temperature.
In Refs. 10 and 11, however, it was shown that strong
thermal noise is not prohibiting on itself and rather de-
termines the family of protocols (in this case, it is the di-
rect reconciliation since it is more resistant with respect
to noise).
Thus, further studies of QKD in the far-infrared and
below spectral regions are warranted, motivated, on
the one hand, by fundamental questions of the quan-
tum/classical interface and the physical origin of infor-
mation [12], and, on the other hand, by the demand to
have matching technologies for emerging small-size high-
bandwidth wireless networks.
In the present paper, we address a question that natu-
rally arises in the context of low-frequency implementa-
tions of QKD. Main results with regard to the frequency
dependence of QKD were obtained within the framework
ar
X
iv
:1
90
9.
07
10
0v
1 
 [q
ua
nt-
ph
]  
16
 Se
p 2
01
9
2of Gaussian states, that is when the Wigner function of
quantum states is a Gaussian function of field quadra-
tures. Overall, this assumption is not too restrictive since
the Gaussian property is preserved in dynamics governed
by Hamiltonians quadratic in the field creation and anni-
hilation operators. Such dynamics envelops a wide range
of physical situations including linear and squeezing sys-
tems. However, in order for a train of transmitted state
to submit to the formalism of Gaussian states, the varia-
tions of the transmitted states must follow the Gaussian
distribution, in which case they essentially mimic thermal
noise. In practical implementations, however, various de-
viations from the Gaussian distribution are unavoidable,
which questions the applicability of the results obtained
within the framework of Gaussian states.
We consider the situation when the actual distri-
bution of displacements of displaced thermal states is
discretized,[13] which clearly demonstrates deviations
from the Gaussian framework. We revisit the standard
theory of CV QKD for Gaussian states in order to dis-
tinguish effects inherent to Gaussian channels and those
caused by the specific form of the distribution of the dis-
placements. To this end, we have to abandon the con-
venient formalism of covariance matrices and to keep ex-
plicit operator form of relevant density matrices.
The strongest manifestations of the departure of
discretized distributions from Gaussian is a non-
monotonous dependence of the key generation rate on
the intensity of the transmitted state. Moreover, the rate
vanishes in the limit of strong excitations making QKD
impossible. Physically, such reduction of the key gener-
ation rate can be understood as follows. Different states
obtained by sufficiently strong displacement of thermal
states are essentially orthogonal to each other and, thus,
can be associated with (practically) commuting operators
in the proof of the no-cloning theorem above. As a result,
large values of the quantization parameter destroy the
no-cloning character of the transmitted quantum states
stripping the QKD off its fundamental background. It
suggests that, in the QKD context, the transition to the
classical regime emerges as an ensemble property rather
than that of individual states.
II. CV QKD NETWORK WITH DISCRETIZED
MODULATIONS
QKD protocols and networks are reviewed in a num-
ber of publications [4–8]. Therefore, here, we will limit
ourselves to setting up the problem of networks with dis-
cretized modulations and defining main notations with-
out going into detailed discussion.
A. The key generation rate
In one-way QKD networks, the key is recovered from
two strings of data held by the sender, A, and the re-
ceiver, B. On the A side, the string ΣA = {ζ1, . . .} com-
prises the values of the control parameters, while, on the
B side, ΣB = {κ1, . . .} is populated by the results of ob-
servations. Assuming that there are no quantum corre-
lations within ΣA and ΣB , these strings can be regarded
as classical obtained as a result of a communication with
abundant information over a noisy channel. According
to Shannon’s theory, the length of a perfectly correlated
substring recoverable from ΣA and ΣB in the asymptotic
limit is proportional to mutual information
I(A : B) =
∫
dζdκΠ(ζ, κ) ln
[
Π(ζ, κ)
Π0(ζ)Π(κ)
]
, (1)
where Π(ζ, κ) is the joint distribution function of the con-
trolling parameters and the results of observations, and
Π0(ζ) and Π(κ) are the respective marginal distributions.
The base of logarithm in Eq. (1) determines units for
measuring information. We adopt natural units (nat),
which slightly simplifies derived formulas.
In one-way protocols, the distribution of outcomes
of receiver’s measurements deterministically depends on
transmitted state, so that the joint distribution has the
form
Π(ζ, κ) = ΠK(κ|ζ)Π0(ζ), (2)
where ΠK(κ|ζ) is the conditional probability of obtaining
κ while observing K for a system in a state obtained with
the controlling parameters set to ζ. In physical terms, the
conditional probability can be presented as ΠK(κ|ζ) =
Tr[EK(κ)ρ(ζ)], where ρ(ζ) is the density matrix of the full
channel-environment state at the final stage of a QKD
transaction starting from the state prepared with ζ, and
EK(κ) is the respective spectral projector. Since, only the
reduced density matrix at the receiving side is relevant,
we have ΠK(κ|ζ) = Tr[EK(κ)ρB(ζ)], where
ρB(ζ) = TrE [ρ(ζ)] , (3)
with traced out environmental degrees of freedom.
Using Eq. (2) in Eq. (1), we obtain
I(A : B) = S
(
ΠK(κ|ζ)
)
− S (ΠK(κ|ζ)), (4)
where S[f(κ)] = − ∫ dκ f(κ) ln[f(κ)] is Shannon’s en-
tropy of distribution f(x). The overline, as in Eq. (4), de-
notes averaging with respect to the controlling parameter
F (ζ) =
∫
dζ F (ζ)Π0(ζ). For such averaging, we will also
use the standard expectation symbol: EF (ζ) = F (ζ).
Applying an error correction kind of algorithm to ΣA
and ΣB , the communicating parties can “recover the orig-
inal message” or, more formally, construct a common
shared string ΣK . In the absence of noise of uncontrolled
origin (untrusted noise), ΣK would constitute a secret
key. Thus, the rate of generation of secret key in this
case is simply R = I(A : B). In the presence of untrusted
noise, however, the actual key must be constructed as-
suming that this noise is due to eavesdropping. In this
3case, the key rate must be adjusted to account for infor-
mation intercepted by the eavesdropper, which yields
R = I(A : B)− χE . (5)
Here, χE quantifies the amount of information accessi-
ble to the third party for a given magnitude of untrusted
noise. Since ΣK is reconstructed from ΣA and ΣB rather
than transmitted, say, from A to B, either A or B can
be regarded as the holder of the “original message” and,
respectively, either A or B can initiate error correction.
These scenarios are called direct and reverse reconcilia-
tion, respectively [14, 15]. In the present paper, we limit
ourselves to the case of direct reconciliation, as it demon-
strates stronger resilience with respect to thermal noise.
In this case, the maximum information is limited from
above by the mutual quantum information between A
and E (Holevo bound), χE = χ(A : E) with
χ(A : E) = H
(
ρE(ζ)
)
−H (ρE(ζ)), (6)
where H(ρ) = −Tr[ρ ln(ρ)] is the von Neumann entropy
of the density matrix ρ and ρE(ζ) = TrB [ρ(ζ)] is the
density matrix of environment obtained by tracing out
the receiver degree of freedom.
It must be noted that the fraction of recoverable mes-
sage in a noisy string reaches Shannon’s limit, I(A : B),
only asymptotically, when the length of the transmit-
ted messages, N , is infinite, and the error correction
algorithm is perfect. For finite N and realistic algo-
rithms, one needs to take into account that the recov-
erable message is shorter then prescribed by Shannon’s
limit. In the analysis of QKD protocols, this circum-
stance is accounted for by renormalizing the mutual in-
formation by the reconciliation efficiency λ, so that the
actual secret key generation rate is given instead by
R = λI(A : B) − χE . Usually, the reconciliation ef-
ficiency is regarded as determined by classical parame-
ters and post-processing, see, e.g. [16–18]. We, however,
show below that there are corrections of essentially quan-
tum origin that modify the key generation rate, so that
the finite-N effect cannot be accounted by the reconcil-
iation efficiency alone. Because of this circumstance, we
will presume that main limitations arise due the discrete
character of the displacement parameter and will take
λ = 1.
B. Transmitted states
In the present paper, we limit ourselves to the sin-
gle mode approximation, which assumes that only one
mode contributes into QKD transactions. First, we de-
scribe a general model of transmitted displaced single-
mode states and establish general relations between these
states and the mutual information that they can carry.
Displaced states are a particular case of Perelomov’s
coherent states [19]. Let the sender’s source cavity sub-
jected to a semi-classical excitation be initially in thermal
state
ρ˜(0; n˜) =
e−βa
†
0a0
1 + n˜
, (7)
where β = ln
(
1 + n˜−1
)
, n˜ is the average population of the
cavity mode, and a†0 and a0 are the cavity mode creating
and annihilating operators, respectively. The dynamics
of the driven cavity is described by Hint = a†0E + a0E∗,
where E is the complex amplitude of the external clas-
sical field. The evolution operator describing the action
of the semi-classical excitation is Glauber’s displacement
operator DA and, thus, we assume that the states leaving
the cavity have the form
ρ˜A(ζ˜; n˜) = DA(ζ˜)ρ˜A(0; n˜)D†A(ζ˜), (8)
with
DA(ζ˜) = exp
(
a†0ζ˜ − a0ζ˜∗
)
. (9)
Here ζ˜ depends on the magnitude and duration of the
classical driving field. Its relation with the displacement
of transmitted states is described below in the model of
discretized modulations.
The linear coupling between the channel mode and
environment is described by the Hamiltonian He =
f(t)
(
a†ea0 + a
†
0ae
)
, where ae and a
†
e are the operators
corresponding to the external field. Let the initial state
of the channel and the external field be ρ˜c and ρe, re-
spectively. Then, the result of such coupling is given
by ρ = Sρ˜c ⊗ ρeS†, where S is the evolution operator
describing the action of He. In order to describe the ac-
tion of S, it is convenient to consider the external and
the channel modes on the equal footing and to introduce
vector notations a† ·v ≡ v0a†0 +vea†e with complex v0 and
ve. Then, the action of S can be represented as
Sf(a† · v)S† = f
[
a† · (Ŝv)
]
, (10)
where Ŝ is the scattering matrix relating initial and final
operators (
a0(out)
ae(out)
)
= Ŝ
(
a0(in)
ae(in)
)
, (11)
with
Ŝ =
(
t r∗
−r t∗
)
. (12)
Thus, the linear coupling can be represented as mixing
the external and channel mode on a beam-splitter char-
acterized by complex reflection and transmission coeffi-
cients, r and t, constrained by the unitarity condition
|t|2 + |r|2 = 1.
Measurements of the channel field after such interac-
tion are described by the effective channel density ma-
trix obtained by tracing the external degrees of freedom
4ρc = Tre [ρ]. If the channel is initially in the displaced
thermal state ρ˜c = D(ζ˜)ρ˜A(0; n˜)D†(ζ˜), then ρc is also a
displaced thermal state
ρc = D(ζ)ρA(0)D†(ζ), (13)
where ζ = e†0 · (Ŝζ) with e†0 = (1, 0) and ζ = (ζ˜, 0)T , so
that ζ = tζ˜, and
ρA(0) = Tre
[Sρ˜A(0)⊗ ρeS†] . (14)
Let the ambient electromagnetic field be in a thermal
state characterized by the average population na. The
beam splitter turns the incoming state into the channel
state (see Stage I in Fig. 1)
ρA(ζ;n) = Tra
[
S(r, t)ρA(ζ˜;n0)⊗ ρth(na)S†(r, t)
]
,
(15)
where S(r, t) is an operator describing the transformation
induced by the beam splitter.
Using the P -representation for the density matrices,
we can rewrite this equation as
ρA(ζ;n) =
1
pi2n0na
∫
d2z0d
2zae
−|z0|2/n0−|za|2/na
× Tra
[SD(v) |0〉 〈0| D†(v)S†] , (16)
whereD(v) = exp(v · a† − v∗ · a) and v·a† = v0a†0+vaa†a
with v0 = z0 + ζ and va = za. Taking into account that
SD(v) |0〉 = D(u) |0〉 with u = Ŝv, we obtain
ρA(ζ;n) =
1
pi2n0na
∫
d2z0d
2zae
−|z0|2/n0−|za|2/na
×D(u0) |0〉 〈0| D†(u0).
(17)
By changing the integration variables, Eq. (17) can be
turned into the canonical form yielding
ζ = tζ˜, n = |t|2n0 + |r|2na. (18)
Thus, the modulation of the transmitted state for a given
outcome of the source of displaced thermal states can
be achieved by varying the complex transmission coef-
ficient of the beam splitter. The modulation of post-
source states is commonly used in experimental imple-
mentations of QKD.
If controls determining the value of t admit a finite
number of states, t takes values at a finite number of
points inside the unit circle on the complex plane. These
points are mapped by multiplication by ζ˜ into the com-
plex ζ-plane resulting in discretized modulations. In the
present paper, we consider the effect of the magnitude of
ζ˜ or, more physically, of the strength of the quasi-classical
excitation, on the key generation rate. To this end, we
represent the modulation value as sζ, where s is a scaling
parameter.
Some results obtained below can be formulated for
a general observable K measured at the receiving end.
Such generalization may be of interest in the context of
low-frequency spectral domains, where a wide variety of
methods to control the electromagnetic field is available.
In the present paper, however, we will limit ourselves to
the case when quadratures are measured. In this case,
the conditional probability to obtain value κ is given by
ΠK(κ|ζ) = Q(κ|ζ) ≡ 1√
2piσ2
exp
{
− 1
σ2
[κ− 〈κζ〉]2
}
,
(19)
where σ2 = 2n+ 1 and 〈κζ〉 =
√
2 Re
(
tζeiθ
)
. The family
of quadratures is parametrized by the phase parameter θ
and the argument of the channel transmission coefficient.
A variety of protocols is based on the precise control over
the quadrature phase provided by synchronizing the local
oscillator in the homodyne detection of the quadrature.
Here, we do not put any restrictions on the phase thus
allowing for an unsynchronized local oscillator.
C. Physical model of the information loss
We model an efficient coupling with environment using
the model of Gaussian collective attacks. These attacks
are proven to be optimal for Gaussian protocols and are
conjectured to be optimal in general [20–22]. Within this
model, eavesdropping masks itself as thermal noise, so
that the initially the external coupled state purifies ther-
mal state. More specifically, the external field is initially
prepared in a two-mode squeezed vacuum (TMSV) state
ρ
(0)
E = F(µ) |0〉 〈0| F†(µ), (20)
where F(µ) is the two-mode squeezing operator. Denot-
ing the operators of the environment modes by a2 and
a3, we have
F(µ) = exp
[
µ
(
a†2a
†
3 − a2a3
)]
. (21)
Generally, the squeezing parameter can be complex. Its
argument, however, can be absorbed into a2,3 without
changing final results. Therefore, Eq. (21) presumes that
the squeezing parameter is a real number, which simpli-
fies intermediate formulas.
One of the squeezed modes is mixed with the channel
mode on a beam splitter, while the second mode is col-
lected together with the mode transmitted through the
beam splitter (see Stage II in Fig. 1), which constitutes
ρE(ζ) in Eq. (6). The strength of coupling of the chan-
nel mode with environment is quantified by the reflection
coefficient of the beam splitter, rE , which also can be as-
sumed real without loss of generality.
III. UNTRUSTED NOISE AND INFORMATION
LEAKED INTO ENVIRONMENT
One of the main objectives of a theory of QKD is to
establish the amount of leaked information for a given
5FIG. 1. Propagation of quantum state in a QKD transaction.
Stage I: preparation of quantum state. Stage II: the effect of
environment and the model of information losses. Stage III:
detection.
(measured during the communication session) amount of
untrusted noise. Based on this knowledge, the commu-
nicating parties decide whether the secret key can be ex-
tracted (if mutual information exceeds losses) or the re-
sults of the communication session must be abandoned.
A. The emergence of untrusted noise
An efficient coupling of channel modes with environ-
ment in a purified thermal states affects the channel mode
in the same way as coupling with a thermal state. Indeed,
while evaluating the partial trace over the eavesdropper’s
modes in Eq. (3), one needs to take into account that the
displacement direction of the channel state is orthogonal
to the plane of squeezing. Thus, tracing out the mode,
which is not mixed with the state in the channel, yields
ρB(ζ) =
∑
m2
〈m2|S(θ)ρA(ζ;n)⊗ ρ˜thS†(θ)|m2〉 , (22)
where ρ˜th is an effective thermal state
ρ˜th =
1
cosh2(µ)
∑
m3
tanh2m3(µ) |m3〉 〈m3| . (23)
Thus, from the channel perspective, the efficient cou-
pling is indistinguishable from coupling with a thermal
state ρth(sinh
2(µ)). If all environment states are of un-
controlled origin, then at the receiving side we have
ρB(ζ) = ρth(tEζ, nt
2
E + nE), where
nE = r
2
E sinh
2(µ) (24)
is the magnitude of untrusted noise and we have taken
into account that the parameters describing the strength
of the coupling with environment, tE and rE , can be
chosen real.
Importantly, this implies the reverse: any untrusted
noise must be regarded as stemming from the information
loss through the efficient coupling.
B. Information loss
When A announces its data, the amount of leaked in-
formation is limited by the Holevo bound χ(A : E). Since
we do not assume the Gaussian form of Π0(ζ), it is con-
venient to rewrite the environment density matrix in the
form distinguishing non-Gaussian modulations and prop-
agation in the Gaussian channel
ρE(ζ) = D2(−rζ)ρ˜ED†2(−rζ), (25)
where
ρ˜E = TrA
[S(θ)ρth(n)⊗ ρF (µ)S†(θ)] (26)
is the density matrix of a TMSV mixed with a thermal
state. This density matrix is independent of the modu-
lation parameter and, due to invariance of von Neumann
entropy with respect to unitary transformations of the
density matrix, we immediately obtain
H (ρE(ζ)) = H (ρ˜E) . (27)
While ρ˜E is a Gaussian state and, therefore, is com-
pletely characterized by its covariance matrix, in order
to find ρE(ζ), it is convenient to have an explicit form
of ρ˜E in an operator form. It can be recovered from
the covariance matrix. We find it constructive, how-
ever, to perform the calculation using the representation
in terms of creation and annihilation operators and to
demonstrate the emergence of the phase space represen-
tation. It can be done, for example, as follows. Us-
ing the P -representation for ρth in Eq. (26), it can be
rewritten as ρ˜E = F(µt)ρ̂EF†(µt), where µt is defined
by τt ≡ tanh(µt) = t tanh(µ) and
ρ̂E =
1
pin¯
∫
dα e−|α|
2/n¯D2(αc)D3(αs)
× |0〉 〈0| ⊗ ρ(3)th (n¯E)D†3(αs)D†2(αc),
(28)
with αc = rα cosh(µt), and αs = −rα∗ sinh(µt). In this
expression, ρ
(3)
th (nE) = Z
−1
E exp
(
−βEa†3a3
)
is a thermal
state characterized by the same average number of par-
ticles nE = r
2 sinh2(µ) as the magnitude of untrusted
noise. Using again the P -representation turns Eq. (28)
into
ρ̂E =
1
pi2nrnE
∫
dz e−|z2|
2/nr−|z3+τtz∗2 |2/nE
D(z) |0〉 〈0| D†(z),
(29)
where we have introduced nr = r
2n cosh2(µt) = r
2n/(1−
τ2t ), dz = dz2 dz3, and
D(z) = exp
(
z2a
†
2 + z3a
†
3 − h.c.
)
. (30)
A connection with the phase space formalism is then es-
tablished through Williamson’s theorem [23] that guar-
antees that any Gaussian state can be presented as a
transformation of a direct product of thermal states. In
terms of representation of the density matrix given by
Eq. (29), this means that the form −|z2|2/nr − |z3 +
6τtz
∗
2 |2/nE can be diagonalized by proper transformations.
To this end, it is convenient to rewrite the argument in
Eq. (30) as
z · a† − z∗ · a = (z z∗)Ĵ( a
a†
)
, (31)
where Ĵ =
(
0 1̂
−1̂ 0
)
, with 1̂ being the 2 × 2 identity
matrix, is a symplectic form consistent with the commu-
tation relations: C − CT = Ĵ , where C =
(
a
a†
)
⊗
(
a
a†
)
.
It can be seen that transformations of creation and anni-
hilation operators preserving the commutation relations
induce “symplectic orthogonal” transformation of z1,2.
Indeed, transformation of operators a→ b according to
R̂
(
a
a†
)
=
(
b
b†
)
(32)
induces transformation z→ w
− (z z∗)ĴR̂Ĵ = (w w∗). (33)
For example, two-mode squeezing described by operator
F(γ) yields
w2 = z2 cosh(γ)− z∗3 sinh(γ),
w3 = z3 cosh(γ)− z∗2 sinh(γ).
(34)
It turns out, two-mode squeezing is the only transforma-
tion needed for diagonalization of the form in the expo-
nential term in Eq. (29), so that
ρ̂E = F(γ)ρ(2)th (n2)⊗ ρ(3)th (n3)F†(γ) (35)
where
tanh(2γ) =
2τt
Y + 2
(36)
with Y = X + τ2t − 1 , X = nr/nE , and
n2,3 =
2nE√
Y 2 + 4X ± Y . (37)
Collecting these results, we obtain the averaged density
matrix of environment (up to a ζ-independent unitary
transformation) ρE =
∫
dζ Π0(ζ)ρE(ζ), where
ρE(ζ) = D(z(ζ))ρ(2)th (n2)⊗ ρ(3)th (n3)D†(z(ζ)), (38)
with z2(ζ) = −sζrE cosh(µ+ γ) and z3(ζ) =
sζ∗rE sinh(µ+ γ).
IV. KEY GENERATION RATE
A. Strong modulation limit
The limit of strong modulations, when the magnitude
of ζ exceeds characteristic scales describing channel and
FIG. 2. An example of the Wigner distribution of the en-
vironment density matrix traced over one of the degrees of
freedom, ρ
(red)
E = Tr2[ρ˜E ] in the case of (a) weak and (b)
strong modulations. The distribution of ζ’s is assumed to be
uniform over points ±1 ± i of the complex plane.
environment modes, is the simplest since, in this limit,
quantum correlations in environment between individual
transactions become negligible. Figure 2(a) shows partial
Wigner distribution of the environment density matrix in
the case when the modulation parameter is strong s 1,
so that the fluctuations of the displacement parameter
exceed the width of Gaussian states s∆ζ  max(n2, n3),
where n2,3 are given by Eq. (37), and ∆ζ is the mag-
nitude of a “typical” separation between points in the
ζ-plane. The multimodal character of the Wigner distri-
bution in Fig. 2(b) is the principal feature of the environ-
ment density matrix when the magnitude of discretized
modulations becomes too strong.
A formal manifestation of this observation is vanishing
commutators of individual terms with ζ 6= ζ ′ in ρE
[ρE(ζ), ρE(ζ
′)] ∝ e−(z(ζ)−z(ζ′))∗·n̂−1·(z(ζ)−z(ζ′)), (39)
where n̂ = diag(n2, n3). Based on that, the perturbation
theory can be used for an analysis of the spectrum of ρE
with the characteristic decay of small terms ∝ e−s2/s20
with s−20 ∝ ∆ζr2E
(
n−12 cosh
2(µ+ γ) + n−13 sinh
2(µ+ γ)
)
7as s → ∞. The precise form of s0 depends on the mu-
tual arrangement of eigenvalues of individual terms in
ρE . For example, when Π0(ζ) = 1/M , where M is the
total number of values of modulations, all eigenvalues of
Π0(ζ)ρE(ζ) are M -fold degenerate and s
2
0 may acquire a
factor depending on details of distribution of ζ’s in the
complex plane. As will be apparent from the following,
however, the exact asymptotic form of the Holevo bound
may be of rather minor importance. Therefore, for the
purpose of the present paper it suffices to limit ourselves
to the zeroth order of the perturbation theory, when the
overlap between the eigenstates of ρE(ζ) and ρE(ζ
′) for
ζ 6= ζ ′ is completely neglected.
In this case, the commutator above vanishes and the
environment density matrix reduces to the direct sum of
individual ρE(ζ). Taking into account that H(
⊕
n ρn) =∑
nH(ρn) for any set of commuting operators ρn. and
H(aρ) = −a ln(a) + aH(ρ) for a real number a and nor-
malized ρ, we obtain
H (ρE) = S (Π0(ζ)) +H(ρE(ζ)). (40)
Thus, in the limit of strong modulations, the Holevo
bound saturates at the entropy of the distribution of
the modulation parameter. Since this entropy limits the
amount of transmitted information, we conclude that in
the limit of strong modulations the rate of generation of
the secure key is vanishing and the QKD is impossible.
At the same time, it should be noted that the ac-
tual limit reached by I(A : B) may be strictly smaller
than S (Π0(ζ)) owing to the details how the modula-
tion parameter enters the propagator Q(κ|ζ). For ex-
ample, as shown in Eq. (19), the homodyne detection of
quadratures depends on the value of modulation through
〈κζ〉 =
√
2 Re(tζeiθ). Then, in the limit of strong modu-
lations, the mutual information asymptotically tends to
the entropy of distribution of this parameter, I(A : B) =
S(Π0(〈κζ〉)). Up to scaling, the distribution of 〈κζ〉 has
the same form as that of the projection of the distribu-
tion of ζ onto the line passing through the origin of the
complex plane at the angle determined by the angular
parameter of the quadrature and the phase of the effec-
tive transmission coefficient t. If the distribution of ζ
has a cluster form, after such projection the clusters may
overlap yielding a distribution with smaller entropy.
From the QKD perspective, the consequence of mis-
matched asymptotics of I(A : B) and χ(A : E) is that in
the limit of strong modulations there is a sharp security
boundary: there is a maximal magnitude, beyond which
QKD is impossible.
It should be noted that, in the consideration above,
the quadrature phase parameter θ is not presumed to be
controlled by communicating parties. Such control can
be achieved by synchronizing the local oscillator in the
homogeneous detection of quadratures. On the one hand,
this provides means to ensure the certain orientation of
distribution Π0(ζ) in the complex plane thus minimizing
the loss of information due to its projection on the real
axis. On the other hand, due to the effect of the phase
acquired during propagation, accounted for by the argu-
ment of the effective transmission coefficient t, such syn-
chronization is a non-trivial task and poses a challenge for
practical implementations of CV QKD. Therefore, it is
worth noting that the analysis above confirms that such
synchronization, while beneficial, is not strictly required
[24]. Random variations of θ can be taken into consid-
eration while optimizing particular implementations and
accounted for in the estimate of the mutual information
between the communicating parties.
We take into account this circumstance by limiting
ourselves in the following numerical evaluations to dis-
tributions tζeiθ confined to the real axis. This doesn’t
impact significantly the generality, while simplifies the
discussion.
Because the physical origin of vanishing key generation
rate is the effective emergence of the classical ensemble
of states due to the weak overlap of individual density
matrices in the limit of strong variation, it affects all pro-
tocols based on displaced coherent states, including those
with Gaussian distribution of the displacing parameter.
Because of the finite length of the sequence of transmit-
ted quantum states, the signal of sufficiently strong am-
plitude will “separate” individual states leading to col-
lapsing key generation rate. It must be noted that this
kind of finite-length effect cannot be accounted by rec-
onciliation efficiency, which quantifies the error correc-
tion algorithm and renormalizes the mutual information.
Moreover, high efficiency (yielding λ > 0.95) is reached in
the limit of high signal-to-noise ratio [16–18], thus mak-
ing the estimate of the protocol performance vulnerable
with respect to the effect of emergence of classical en-
sembles when the length of the sequence of transmitted
quantum states is relatively small.
B. Weak modulation limit
In the opposite limit of weak modulations (small s),
both the mutual information and the Holevo bound van-
ish in a threshold-less manner and their Taylor expan-
sions start with terms quadratic in s. Thus, in this limit,
R = s2C, (41)
where
C =
d2
ds2
[I(A : B)− χ(A : E)] . (42)
The key can be generated, if C > 0.
It follows straightforwardly from Eq. (19) that
d2
ds2
I(A : B) =
2
σ2
E
[
〈κ(ζ)〉 − 〈κ(ζ)〉
]2
. (43)
It should be noted, that, in this limit, the non-ideal
reconciliation efficiency leads to simple renormalization
〈κ(ζ)〉 → √λ 〈κ(ζ)〉.
8The Holevo bound is determined by the eigenvalues
of ρE . When s = 0, they are given by the product of
eigenvalues of ρ
(2,3)
th in Eq. (38). Since ρ
(2,3)
th are diagonal
in the product of Fock bases, it is convenient to introduce
a “vector” notation for the basis states |l〉 ≡ |l2, l3〉, so
that ρ
(l)
E (0), the eigenvalues at s = 0, can be expressed
in terms of the average number of thermal photons n2,3
as
ρ
(l)
E (0) =
e−β2l2−β3l3
(1 + n2) (1 + n3)
, (44)
where β2,3 = ln(1 + 1/n2,3).
Since we are interested only in the variation of the
eigenvalues, we can use the similar approach as for the
Feynman-Hellmann theorem. The first order is given by
∂ρ
(l)
E /∂s
∣∣∣
s=0
= 〈l|∂ρE(0)/∂s|l〉, while in the second or-
der we have
∂2ρ
(l)
E
∂s2
∣∣∣∣∣
s=0
= 〈l|∂2ρE(0)/∂s2|l〉+
+ 2
∑
m6=l
〈l|∂ρE(0)/∂s|m〉 〈m|∂ρE(0)/∂s|l〉
ρ
(l)
2,3(0)− ρ(m)2,3 (0)
,
(45)
where l = (l2, l3) and m = (m2,m3).
Introducing sV(ζ) = z(ζ) · a† − z∗(ζ) · a, these expres-
sions can be rewritten in a more explicit form
∂
∂s
ρ
(l)
E
∣∣∣∣
s=0
= 〈l|
[
V(ζ), ρE(0)
]
|l〉 ,
∂2
∂s2
ρ
(l)
E
∣∣∣∣
s=0
= 〈l|
(
V2(ζ)ρE(0) + ρE(0)V2(ζ)
)
|l〉−
− 2 〈l|V(ζ)ρE(0)V(ζ)|l〉 .
(46)
Because of invariance of the von Neumann entropy
with respect to unitary transformations of the density
matrix, we can set ζ = 0 without any loss of generality,
which yields
∂2
∂s2
χ(A : E)
∣∣∣∣
s=0
=
∑
l
∂2
∂s2
ρ
(l)
E (0) ln
[
ρ
(l)
E (0)
]
. (47)
Using Eq. (46) in this expression, we obtain
∂2
∂s2
χ(A : E)
∣∣∣∣
s=0
= 2|ζ|2r2E
[
β2 cosh
2(µ+ γ)
+β3 sinh
2(µ+ γ)
]
.
(48)
Together with Eq. (43), this expression gives an explicit
condition whether the QKD is possible in the limit of
weak modulations.
We conclude consideration of the limiting cases by
noticing that they imply that the key generation rate is
a non-monotonous function of the signal strength. Thus,
FIG. 3. (a) The security boundary C(rE , ω) = 0 (see Eq. (42))
in up to the mid-infrared region (the shortest wavelength is
4.7 µm) for fixed effective temperature of environment: (1)
T = 100 K, (2) T = 300 K, (3) T = 500 K. The regions
above and below the curve correspond to insecure and secure
regimes, respectively. (b, c) Numerical evaluation of the signal
dependence of the key generation rate at (a) ω = 2 · 1013 Hz
and r2E = 0.01, and (b) ω = 3 · 1014 Hz and r2E = 0.22.
an implementation of a QKD protocol based on dis-
cretized modulations must include solution of the respec-
tive optimization problem taking into account the char-
acteristics of the communication channel and the magni-
tude of untrusted noise.
9V. WEAK AND STRONG NOISE REGIMES
In order to investigate the dependence of the security
boundary given by C = 0 on parameters of environ-
ment and coupling with it, we assume that the effec-
tive temperature of environment is fixed. In Fig. 3(a),
we plot C(rE , µ, ω) = 0, the phase diagram separat-
ing secure and insecure regimes, with imposed constrain
r2E sinh
2(µ) = const, as a function of coupling with envi-
ronment and the carrier frequency (energy) of the quan-
tum states. It demonstrates that at low frequencies, the
security boundary obtained in the weak modulation limit
correctly distinguishes secure and insecure regimes even
when the modulation is not necessarily weak. Presented
in Fig. 3(b) signal dependencies of the key generation
rate show that the sign of R does not change with the
magnitude of displacement.
The security boundary defined as C = 0 predicts that
with increasing frequency the maximal coupling with en-
vironment admitting generation of the key eventually
starts to decrease signifying that the condition C = 0
is no longer applicable when the number of thermal pho-
tons at the energy of transmitted states becomes smaller
than one. This observation is confirmed by comparing
the security boundary found as C = 0 with numerically
obtained security boundary presented in Fig. 4.
It should be noted that the condition C = 0 correctly
predicts the security of protocols utilizing weak states
even in this case. To illustrate this circumstance, we show
in Fig. 3(c) the signal dependence of the key generation
rate in the the case when thermal noise is small. It shows
that for systems that are in different regions according to
the weak signal and a precise condition, there is a critical
magnitude of the signal, below which QKD is impossible.
Taking into account the effect of non-ideal reconciliation
efficiency and non-optimal distribution of the displace-
ment parameter discussed in the previous section, this
means that, in the weak noise regime, protocols based
on discretized modulations may admit the key genera-
tion only when the signal magnitude is within the certain
range. A detailed investigation of the critical strength re-
quires more refined approach and will be presented else-
where.
On the contrary, in the strong noise regime, which is of
the most interest from the perspective of low-frequency
implementations of QKD, the emergence of the lower
threshold appears to be rather marginal effect and the se-
curity of QKD can be investigated using the weak-signal
approximation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In anticipation of appearance implementations of QKD
protocols in the spectral domain below the mid-infrared,
we have considered a general problem of QKD protocols
based on displaced thermal states with a discretized dis-
tribution of the displacement parameter. We have stud-
FIG. 4. The security boundary on the (rE , ω)-plane for T =
300 K. The dashed line shows the security boundary based
on the weak signal approximation and the solid line presents
the security boundary obtained by a numerical simulation of
QKD transactions with discretized modulations (dotted line).
ied specific features of such protocols distinguishing them
from well-studied protocols utilizing Gaussian states. We
developed a basic formalism separating the effects of the
Gaussian channel and non-Gaussian modulations. With
the help of this formalism, we have studied the effect of
the magnitude of the quasi-classical driving field in the
source of displaced quantum states.
The main important feature, specific for protocols with
discretized modulations, is the impossibility to gener-
ate secret key, in the limit of strong magnitude of the
quasi-classical field. The physical origin of such collapse
of QKD is weak overlap of the density matrices of in-
dividual states, which makes the transmitted sequence
of quantum states essentially classical. In this limit, in-
formation available for eavesdropper is limited only by
the entropy of the distribution of the displacement pa-
rameter, which, in turn, limits from above the mutual
information between legitimate communicating parties.
Since the emergence of the classical ensemble is due to
lacunae in the factual filling the complex plane by the
values of the displacement parameter used for prepara-
tion of transmitted states, it becomes a limiting factor
whenever the number of transmitted states is too small
even if they are sampled from the Gaussian distribution.
This is a manifestation of possible quantum correlations
between the transmitted states and environment (eaves-
dropper). This indicates that the usual incorporation of
the finite-length effect through introduction of the rec-
onciliation efficiency, which takes into account only the
classical component of the QKD protocol, may not be
enough to estimate correctly the possible key generation
rate.
The numerical investigation of the signal strength de-
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pendence of the key generation rate revealed that two op-
erating regimes must be distinguished: strong and weak
noise. The strong noise regime is relevant when the num-
ber of thermal photons is large and is of the most impor-
tance for low-frequency QKD implementations. In this
case, the security boundary is determined by the weak
signal limit and we have found its explicit form.
The weak noise regime corresponds to a small number
of thermal photons. Numerical simulations showed that
in this regime a low-signal threshold may appear, so that
the secret key can be generated only when the signal
is sufficiently strong (but not too strong because of the
transition to the classical ensemble discussed above).
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